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SUMMARY
The Programme for the Reduction of Bureaucracy launched by the Hungarian government in 
2015 has several directions, such as rethinking of the system of administrative organs, reshaping of 
civil service, simplification of administrative procedures, and fight against administrative silence, 
as well. New codes on the administrative procedure and on the judicial review of the administrative 
decisions were passed in 2016 and 2017, and the sectoral regulation has been transformed, as well. 
The most important change of the sectoral procedural rules was the replacement of procedures for 
permissions to a simple duty of notification. The authors investigate, if these institutions really help 
to reduce the burdens citizens and companies have in connection with bureaucracy: whether they 
are efficient tools against administrative silence and really are improving the situation of the parties 
vis-à-vis the administration and fostering good administration. They also take a closer look on the 
newly established action for failure to Act I of 2017 on the Code of Administrative Court Procedure 
(in force since 2018) intended as an additional tool, as well as its other new institutions addressing 
the problem of silence of administration.
Keywords: administrative silence; legal remedies against failure to act; court action against failure 
to act; right to good administration; right to an effective remedy
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INTRODUCTION: METHODS AND HYPOTHESIS
The Programme for the Reduction of Bureaucracy launched by the Hungarian 
government in 2015 has several directions, such as rethinking of the system of 
administrative organs, reshaping of civil service, simplification of administrative 
procedures, and fight against administrative silence, as well. Already with the first 
legislative step, more than 100 acts regulating sectoral questions of administrative 
procedure were modified. The General Rules of Administrative Proceedings and 
Services1 has known serious alterations, too. One of its major novelties was the 
so-called “conditional decision”, which institution was upheld by the new Hun-
garian Act CL of 2016 on the Code of General Administrative Procedure2 (GAP) 
with some modifications. This institution practically aims at one hand at replacing 
silent decision-making, an institution known in Hungarian law, but not really used 
in praxis and, on the other hand, prevent the emergence of administrative silence.
The most important change of the sectoral procedural rules was the replacement 
of procedures for permissions to a simple duty of notification, e.g. in the construc-
tion and building administration, the sector which was most affected with failure 
to act in the previous years and decades.
In this study the authors investigate, if these institutions really help to reduce 
the burdens citizens and companies have in connection with bureaucracy: whether 
they are efficient tools against administrative silence and really are improving the 
situation of the parties vis-à-vis the administration and fostering good adminis-
tration. They also take a closer look on the newly established action for failure 
to Act I of 2017 on the Code of Administrative Court Procedure3 intended as an 
additional tool, as well as its other new institutions addressing the problem of 
silence of administration.
Theses of the paper are:
1. The conditional decision cannot generally replace an institution which gave 
parties the possibility to contest the silence of administration in a general 
way, like the former plea for failure did. Albeit the new institutions of ad-
ministrative court procedure significantly increase the efficiency of legal 
protection, they cannot fully replace the less formal and less costly legal 
remedies of administrative procedural law.
2. Administrative actions are like equations. Reduction of bureaucratic bur-
dens resulted in other types of burdens both for parties and administrative 
organs. They involve additional costs and working hours at administrative 
organs and have the effect that more applications are turned down and thus 
1 Act CXL of 2004, in Hungarian: Ket.
2 In force since 1 January 2018, in Hungarian: Ákr.
3 In force since 2018, in Hungarian: Kp.
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rights precluded than before. Risks traditionally borne by the administrative 
decision are now faced by the parties and result in additional costs.
3. It is not (only) the procedural rules, which need reforms, but material law, 
which is too complicated and not harmonised. Better training of civil servants 
would also be vital for more timeliness.
The research method of the paper is mainly jurisprudential, using dogmatic and 
comparative arguments, analysing past and present legislation as well as connected 
jurisdiction. The contribution also makes use of the aggregated data available at 
the official statistical program of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office – the so-
-called OSAP statistics – on the administrative activities of Hungarian authorities 
and of in-depth interviews with civil servants and legal representatives of parties 
to evaluate the new instruments. Unfortunately, the database of the National Office 
for the Judiciary does not have detailed data which could be used similarly.
THE EVOLVEMENT OF A NEW SYSTEM OF INSTITUTIONS TO 
PREVENT ADMINISTRATIVE SILENCE
From 2015, the Hungarian legislator successively created a completely new sys-
tem of procedural institutions to prevent the silence of administration. This system 
has two pillars: an administrative procedural and an administrative judicial pillar.
Belonging to the first pillar, the Programme of Decreasing Bureaucracy was 
launched by the government in 2015. It has several directions, i.a. also the sim-
plification of administrative procedures. The first step in this direction was Act 
CLXXXVI of 2015 on Amendment of Acts Related to the Reduction of Adminis-
trative Bureaucracy and the Government Decree No. 441/2015 (published on 28 
December 2015) connected to the act. This act modified more than 100 other acts 
regulating questions of administrative procedure and contained serious alterations 
to the Act CXL of 2004 on the General Rules of Administrative Proceedings and 
Services, as well. One of its major novelties was the so-called conditional decision, 
an institution of positive silence of administration. This institution practically re-
placed silent decision-making. The most important change of the sectoral procedural 
rules was the abolishment of the building permit for the erection and reconstruction 
of family houses of less than 300 m2.
These changes made by the Parliament and the government had to be fitted better 
into the system of procedural rules. The centralisation of state administration, on the 
one hand, caused the integration of territorial state administration into one single 
organ in each county (except for fiscal administration and police) in 2011 and 2015 
respectively, and the dissolution of the majority of central agencies (agencies under 
ministerial supervision) in 2016, transferring their tasks to the supervising ministries 
and, on the other hand, it created a need to reform the system of second-instance 
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procedures4. Given the interdependencies with court procedures, the codification of 
administrative court procedures made necessary some adjustments, too. So, the first 
pillar was strengthened by the codification of a new Hungarian Act on the Code of 
General Administrative Procedure. This new code was adopted in order to provide for 
a framework for almost all administrative authoritative procedures, only regulating 
the rules which are common to these procedures and thus general5. A further aim 
was to ensure timeliness in administrative procedures. The main goals were thus to 
postulate only rules that are common in all procedures and leave the necessary devi-
ations to the sectoral, special procedural legislation, resulting in shorter, simpler, but 
general regulation for all sectors. The legislator did not expand the scope of the code, 
the GAP – as did the Ket. – only regulates the process and outcome of authoritative 
single decision-making administrative procedures6.
The Programme of Decreasing Bureaucracy continued in 2016 with the reduc-
tion of the number of central government agencies followed with Government De-
cree No. 378/2016 (published on 2 December 2016), which dissolved approximately 
60 government agencies and other (so-called “back-up”) institutions financed by 
the ministries or the government7.
The currently last episode of the Programme of Decreasing Bureaucracy was 
in December 2017, when the Act CLXXXVI of 2017 on Amendment of Acts Re-
lated to the Reduction of Administrative Bureaucracy and to the Simplification of 
Certain Administrative Procedures again simplified several sectoral procedures, for 
example those in building law already modified before. There were also separate 
acts on the modification of single administrative sectoral rules with similar aims8.
The second pillar contains the institutions connected to judicial protection 
against the failures of the administration. At the beginning of 2015, the Hungarian 
4 See more J. Fazekas, Centralization of Government and Legal Traditions in Hungary, [in:] 
Legal Traditions and Legal Identities in Central and Eastern Europe. Collection of Research Papers 
of the 76th International Scientific Conference of the University of Latvia, ed. K. Strada-Rozenberga, 
Riga 2018, p. 383.
5 See more B. Hajas, Alapelvek, [in:] Az általános közigazgatási rendtartás magyarázata. 
A közigazgatási eljárás szabályai I, red. F. Petrik, Budapest 2017, pp. 27–28.
6 Neither contracts, except for the so-called authoritative contract (in German law the Amtsvertrag), 
nor normative decisions belong under the scope of the code. The rules for e-administration are regu-
lated separately, entering into force in several stages expanding e-obligations of administrative organs 
and parties successively since the beginning of 2016 (Act CCXXII of 2015). The general substantive 
rules of administrative sanctions, which have been regulated formerly in the Ket, the previous code on 
administrative procedures, were also transferred to a separate act (Act CXXV of 2017 entering into 
force on January 1, 2019, and for the transitional period until then Act CLXXIX of 2017).
7 See more J. Fazekas, op. cit., pp. 385–386 (supra note 3).
8 One of which would have been the simplifying the drilling of private wells by changing the 
need for permission to a duty of notification. This modification was annulled by the Constitutional 
Court upon the preliminary motion of the president of the republic by its decision from 28 August 
2018 (published as Decision No. 13/2018).
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government finally decided not to regulate administrative court procedures any-
more as a special civil procedure. The Code on Administrative Court Procedure 
(CACP) was promulgated finally on 1 March 2017 to take out the administrative 
court procedures after almost 70 years of the realm of civil procedure9.
These procedural institutions can handle not only the most typical form of 
silence of administration: the non-deciding upon a request, but are aimed also on 
abolishing other types of failures, like the non-execution of administrative court 
judgements, and the non-compliance with judgements, as well as protracted ex 
officio procedures or the administration’s actions to hinder the judicial review of its 
action by not complying with procedural obligations. Before going into the details, 
let us summarise the system (see Table 1).
Table 1. Pillars of the system against administrative silence
First pillar Second pillar
1. Structured system of three types of administrative 
procedure
1. Action against failure to act
2. Conditional decision
2. Court procedure to enforce compliance with 
a judgement
3. Cutting back the possibility of suspension of 
procedure
3. Several types of interim measures
4. Loss of power to sanction in case of overdue 
procedures
4. Pecuniary sanctions for failures in the court 
procedure
5. Duty of notification instead of permission
5. Ius reformandi as a sanction of non-compliance 
with the judgement
Source: Authors’ own study.
FIRST PILLAR: INSTITUTIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
1. Structured system of three types of administrative procedure
The GAP formally regulates three possible types of administrative procedure, 
the existence of which could be deducted from previous regulations. These three 
types of procedures created are the full, summary and automatic decision-making 
procedure10. The summary procedure is to be conducted if the facts of the case are 
clear (all necessary evidence is available to the authority) and there is no party with 
opposing interests: in this case, the authority must take a decision immediately, but 
9 See more K.F. Rozsnyai, Current Tendencies of Judicial Review as Reflected in the New Hun-
garian Code of Administrative Court Procedure, “Central European Public Administration Review” 
2019, Vol. 17(1), DOI: https://doi.org/10.17573/cepar.2019.1.01, p. 7.
10 See more G. Barabás, Sommás eljárás és teljes eljárás, [in:] Kommentár az általános 
közigazgatási rendtartásról szóló törvényhez, red. G. Barabás, B. Baranyi, M. Fazekas, Budapest 
2018, pp. 310–314.
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at the latest within eight days. The automatic decision-making, in which decisions 
shall be issued within 24 hours, is practically a special type of the summary pro-
cedure, with the extra condition that no deliberation is needed to issue a decision. 
This is the case for example in speed driving detected by a speed control device, 
as in Hungary the fees are fixed by law according to the excess speed. Where the 
authority establishes that any condition listed before is not met, it has to conduct 
a full procedure and shall make a conditional decision. The same applies if the 
party submits a new piece of evidence or makes a motion to present evidence. The 
administrative organ also has to adjudicate the application in a full procedure, if 
the party requests this within five days from the communication of the decision 
made in an automatic decision-making procedure or summary procedure. In this 
case, the authority reconsiders the application in a full procedure11.
2. Conditional decision12
This institution has been introduced already from January 2016 in course of 
the Programme for Reduction of Bureaucracy, and was to some extent revised by 
the GAP. If there is no possibility for conducting a summary procedure – either 
because of other parties taking part in the procedure or because the facts of the case 
are not clear – the authority must switch to the full procedure and issue some sort of 
decision within eight days: the application either has to be rejected, the procedure 
suspended or a “conditional decision” has to be issued. The conditional decision 
grants the right asked for in the application conditionally: it only becomes effective 
on the condition that the authority fails to decide the case within 60 days from the 
beginning of the procedure (generally the day of receipt of the application). The 
conditional decision further grants upon its entering into force the reimbursement of 
the fee to pay for the procedure, in its absence a payment of HUF 10,000 (approxi-
mately EUR 35). This institution is only applied in procedures on demand with no 
special time limit set, and the GAP determines a wide range of procedures where it 
cannot be applied, like when the sum to be paid depends on the deliberation of the 
authority13. Further, in the majority of first instance cases of the central agencies 
in Hungary, conditional decisions have not to be made, several of these agencies 
are fully exempt from this obligation (see Table 2).
11 See more A. Forgács, Az elsö fokú eljárás, [in:] Közigazgatási jog. Általánosrész III, red. 
M. Fazekas, Budapest 2017, pp. 249–251.
12 Or previously translated as “decision with suspensive effect”, which can be traced back to 
the too complicated Hungarian name of the institution “függö hatályú döntés”.
13 See more G. Barabás, op. cit., pp. 318–319.
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Table 2. First instance decisions of central agencies in 2018 H2 (without the decisions of the Hungarian 
State Treasury)
Central agency
First instance 
decisions
Conditional 
decisions
Immigration and Asylum Office (BMH) 383 0
Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH) 1,076 0
Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority (MEKH) 10,175 0
National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV) 1,140 0
National Media and Info-communications Authority (NMHH) 15,142 0
National Directorate General for Disaster Management (OKF) 1,124 0
National Headquarters of the Hungarian Police (ORFK) 853 0
Hungarian Intellectual Property Office (SZTNH) 17,129 0
Source: OSAP statistics, www.kormany.hu/hu/dok?page=10&source=7&type=308#!DocumentBrowse [access: 
20.08.2019].
There is just one important exception: in special first instance pension cases 
the Central Office of the Hungarian State Treasury has to issue conditional deci-
sions (see Figure 1). It is firstly related to the competences of the State Treasury 
on the aid to the agricultural entrepreneurs and secondly because of the grave risk 
of administrative silence in regard to the existential security of retired persons14.
Source: OSAP statistics, www.kormany.hu/hu/dok?page=10&source=7&type=308#!DocumentBrowse [access: 
20.08.2019].
14 See more Á. Molnár, Á. Pánczél, Igényérvényesítési és eljárási szabályok, [in:] Nagykom-
mentár a társadalombiztosítási nyugellátásról szóló törvényhez, red. Á. Pánczél, Budapest 2019, 
pp. 346–347.
 
324,895
21,460
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
Hungarian State Treasury
Figure 1. Condional decisions in the first 
instance cases of the Hungarian State Treasury 
(2018 H2)
First instance cases Condional decions (decisions with pending effect)
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3. Other institutions providing protection against the silence 
of administration
In the previous system, the regulation was focused on the time limit of the 
procedure (generally 21 days). There were a lot of intervals which did not count in 
respect of the time limit. This logic of regulation has now been abandoned, and the 
new regulation uses a “gross” deadline, from which only the time of the suspension 
of the procedure can be deducted. The possibility of suspending the procedure at 
the same time was narrowed: there is a need for special permission of the sectoral 
legislator except for preliminary issues.
In ex officio procedures, the sanction of the silence of administration is the loss 
of the right to sanction: if the authority fails to bring a decision within twice the 
time limit (generally 120 days), it loses its power to sanction and can only establish 
the fact of the violation of law and impose the obligation to terminate the unlawful 
conduct or restore the lawful situation15.
The exclusion of the appellate procedure is a great step backward as it means 
less protection vis-à-vis the administration, as judicial procedures do not equal 
the less formal and uncomplicated inner-administrative remedy. Also in regard of 
the silence of administration, the backlog is eminent, as personnel resources are 
reduced drastically in view of to the abolishment of appellate procedures, which 
has the effect, that there is no personnel to act on behalf of the supervisory author-
ity in cases of failure to act. This is further aggravated through the omission of 
the institution of the plea against failure to act, by which the party could ask the 
supervisory authority to examine the case and order the subordinated failing organ 
to realise the omitted administrative action16. Of course, the supervisory authority is 
further entitled to do so, but the party has no right to have his or her plea examined 
by the supervisory authority.
In the building and construction administration, the abolishment of building 
permits has a lot of negative effects, too: the rising of the expenses because of the 
greater responsibility of the architects, as well as risks of non-compliance with local 
or national rules, as well as disputes with neighbours before civil courts (tort law). 
Doubts regarding the safeguards of the right to good administration of neighbours 
as parties also arise, given that they are not informed previously of the building 
activity nor is there an administrative act they could bring to court. To file a case in 
such constellations is almost impossible before the end of the building activity, so 
much greater harm can arise from such cases to both the builder and the neighbours.
15 See more M. Nagy, Dogmatikai alibi megoldások – a közigazgatási szankciós törvényröl, 
“Jogtudományi Közlöny” 2018, Vol. 73(5), pp. 256–257. 
16 I. Hoffman, A.Gy. Kovács, Mulasztási per, [in:] Kommentár a közigazgatási perrendtartáshoz, 
red. G. Barabás, K.F. Rozsnyai, A.Gy. Kovács, Budapest 2018, pp. 691–692.
Pobrane z czasopisma Studia Iuridica Lublinensia http://studiaiuridica.umcs.pl
Data: 29/03/2020 20:13:00
UM
CS
New Hungarian Institutions against Administrative Silence: Friends or Foes of the Parties? 117
SECOND PILLAR: INSTITUTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE COURT 
PROCEDURES
1. New action against failure to act
There is a failure to act, if the administrative action is prescribed by law and the 
administrative organ has not performed it (if there is a time limit, within the time 
limit set). Against such omissions of administrative organs, if the action is governed 
by administrative law, access to court is provided through the procedure against 
failure to act. If the court finds, that there is a failure to act, it only establishes that 
there is an obligation prescribed by law, which the administrative organ responsible 
for failed to realise. According to the rules of the CACP, the administrative organ 
is obliged in this case to carry out the action ex lege, without further prescriptions 
of the judgement.
Before 2018, access to court had to be guaranteed only for two types of omis-
sions. Against the failure to act in administrative authoritative procedures, i.e. the 
omission of issuing an authoritative decision (mostly permits), there was a non-con-
tentious administrative court procedure available to the parties of the administrative 
procedure. Only the administrative authority responsible for the legal supervision 
of local governments could bring omissions outside authoritative procedures before 
court.
The CACP by its wording allows access to court not only against failures of 
authoritative action, but also against other kinds of failures. With respect to this 
much broader access to court, there was need for a differentiated regulation of 
the omission judgement of the court. One such element is that the court does not 
prescribe how the failure has to be healed, as this field is a very large one, with 
different types of obligations, varying in their conditionality or finality. The regu-
lation is following the logic of Article 266 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. If the court states the failure to act, the institution whose failure 
to act has been declared shall be required to take the necessary measures to comply 
with the judgement, so the administrative organ is obliged ex lege, by law to realise 
the omitted administrative action within the time set in sectoral regulations or, if 
there is no time limit set there, within 30 days.
Another element of the regulation is – in order to strike a fair balance between 
free access to courts and the non-engulfment of courts with omission procedures, 
which would render access to court practically ineffective – is the differentiated 
system of deference of the court to establish the failure to act. The CACP knows 
three types of omissions: first, the failure to act where there is a time limit given 
by law for the performance of administrative action. Authoritative decisions and 
decisions in internal appellate procedures, for example in disciplinary procedures of 
professional bodies or universities, belong to this category. The second category is 
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the omission contested by the supervising organ. In these two types of cases, if the 
court states the failure to act, it has to establish the unlawfulness of the omission. 
For all other failures to act, the court has a margin of appreciation: if there is no 
compelling reason of public interest, it does not have to establish the unlawfulness 
of the failure to act, so no obligation to realise the omitted administrative action 
arises from the judgement of the court, as the action will be turned down17.
2. Procedure to handle the silence of administration in the course of the 
implementation of a court judgement
In order to secure the closure of the administrative procedures ordered by the 
administrative tribunals within a reasonable time, sanctioning the administration for 
failure to respect court decisions became possible in various countries. There are 
two main types of judicial decisions where court enforcement mechanisms do not 
work: judgements ordering the repeating of procedures and omission judgements, 
according to which the administrative organ has to fulfil the obligations stated to be 
omitted by a court. The judgements upon the action of the legal supervisory organs 
often belong to this category too, as specialised forms of annulment or omission 
judgements, as well as the judgements ordering the calling of the meeting of an 
organ of the professional body.
A separate chapter deals with these problems in the CACP – it is Chapter XXVI 
entitled “The procedure to enforce compliance with a judgement ordering a new 
procedure or establishing failure to act”. According to its rules, the court has several 
possibilities, if the plaintiff or the interested person signals the non-fulfilment of 
its judgement. After requesting clarification from the administrative organ, if its 
explications are not satisfactory or none is given, the court can impose a fine on 
the administration, which is much higher than the procedural fine, up to HUF 10 
million (approximately EUR 30,000). This fine is not the only tool for achieving 
fulfilment of the judgement, the court may also order another administrative organ 
or, depending on the type of omission, the supervisory authority to perform the duty 
instead. If these tools are of no use, the court can order provisional measures until 
the administrative organ fulfils the obligations which arise from the judgement. 
In the case of a repetitive omission, the leader of the administrative organ can in 
person be fined with a procedural fine, which can be an effective measure against 
the obstruction of administration18.
17 A.Gy. Kovács, Különleges közigazgatási perek és egyéb közigazgatási bírósági eljárások, 
[in:] Közigazgatási jog. Általános rész III, red. M. Fazekas, Budapest 2017, p. 530.
18 See more ibidem, p. 432.
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3. Interim measures against silence of administration
The CACP regulates a set of tools of interim relief. On the one hand, the court 
can order suspensory effect to the administrative action, which cannot be performed 
or have any other effects until the judgement is delivered. Typical for public ser-
vice provision disputes, and also in some environmental cases, the sectoral law 
provides for the suspensory effect to be entailed by the submission of the statement 
of claim. As the inverse tool to ordering the suspensory effect, it may in such cases 
be dissolved partially or in full by the court. Obviously, in the cases of failure to 
act, these tools are not sufficient to provide interim relief. As a third tool thus, the 
court may order any provisional measure within the limits of the decision to be 
adopted in the court procedure to provide protection immediately. The taking of 
evidence in advance is the fourth tool completing the system19. The possibility of 
provisional measures is enhancing the protection in cases of failure to act to a great 
extent, as the court can order measures by which the omitted action is practically 
performed for the time of the court procedure.
4. Reforming the decision issued after retrial as a sanction  
of non-compliance
The implementation of judgements annulling administrative action is not only 
supported by the above tools. Albeit it is formally not a case of silence of adminis-
tration, it practically has the same effects: the administration hinders the party in the 
exercise of its rights. If the new administrative action does not follow the instructions 
given in a court judgement clearly ruling on its obligations regarding the procedure 
to be conducted after the judgement, the court is conferred the possibility to reform it 
as a sanction, even in cases where it is generally not possible for the court to reform 
(vary) the administrative act20. The new CACP gives this possibility to the courts. This 
new rule – together with the rules for the enforcement of court judgements – even 
had some “retroactive” impact on Hungarian practice, as the request for a preliminary 
ruling from the Administrative and Labour Court, Pécs in the proceedings Alekszij 
Torubarov v. Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal, can be seen as directly flowing 
from this new rule. In this case, the court argued – similarly to the argumentation 
of the minister for justice attached to the CACP – that the narrowing of the powers 
of the first-instance court or tribunal to annulment only in the case where the com-
petent administrative body does not comply with a decision of that court legislation 
effectively deprives applicants for international protection of an effective judicial 
19 K.F. Rozsnyai, op. cit., p. 14.
20 See more P. Kovač, Šutnjau prave izmed u teorije i prakse u Sloveniji, “Zbornik Pravnogfa-
kulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci” 2011, Vol. 27(2), p. 871.
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remedy. The fact that the court has no power either to order the administration to 
grant international protection to the applicant concerned or to impose a penalty for 
the failure by the administration to comply with its first judgement, entails the risk 
that there is a judicial or administrative ping-pong21 procedure can be prolonged 
indefinitely, contrary to the rights of the applicant. Following the argumentation of 
the requesting court, the judgement of the European Court of Justice has practically 
given retroactive effect to this new sanction of non-compliance as the Court (Grand 
Chamber) ruled in his judgement (Case C-556/17):
[…] that, under the criteria laid down by Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or 
stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for 
persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted, that applicant 
must be granted such protection on the ground that he or she relied on in support of his or her appli-
cation, but after which the administrative or quasi-judicial body adopts a contrary decision without 
establishing that new elements have arisen that justify a new assessment of the international protection 
needs of the applicant, that court or tribunal must vary that decision which does not comply with its 
previous judgment and substitute its own decision for it as to the application for international protec-
tion, disapplying as necessary the national law that would prohibit it from proceeding in that way22.
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS OF THE PRACTICE
The effects of the conditional decision are of mixed nature. Although according 
to ministerial opinions the conditional decision is to be the general form of decision 
in the full procedure, numbers do not reflect this role. In 2016, conditional deci-
sions have been issued in only 4.72% of the cases of the district offices, the general 
first instance authorities in Hungary. Since then their share has been moderately 
increasing to 5.16% of the cases of the district offices in 2018 (see Figure 2). The 
number of cases of the district offices had increased significantly. The organizational 
reforms in 2017 transformed the system of the first instance authorities. Formerly 
the major first instance authorities were the district offices, but the complicated 
cases were decided mainly by the county government offices. On 1 January 2017, 
the majority of the first instance competences of the county government offices were 
transferred to the district offices – especially to the district offices of the county 
seats – thus the number of the cases changed significantly.
21 As Advocate General Bobek called it in his opinion delivered in the case Alekszij Torubarov vs 
Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal on 30 April 2019, Case C-556/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:339. http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=213503&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&-
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5871063 [access: 10.02.2020].
22 Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 29 July 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:626; http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=216550&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=-
req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5666736 [access: 10.02.2020].
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Source: OSAP statistics, www.kormany.hu/hu/dok?page=10&source=7&type=308#!DocumentBrowse [access: 
20.08.2019].
Albeit the conditional decisions themselves have a limited role in the battle 
against administrative silence, as from the total of conditional decisions which have 
been issued, in 2016 only 0.15%, and in 2018 – 0.19% of the conditional decisions 
became effective, within its field of application it can be deemed to be an effective 
institution against the silence of administration, as more than 99.8% of the cases 
with conditional decisions were completed within the deadline (see Figure 3).
Source: OSAP statistics, www.kormany.hu/hu/dok?page=10&source=7&type=308#!DocumentBrowse [access: 
20.08.2019].
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In spite of the small share of conditional decisions, the institution itself certainly 
accelerates administrative procedures. An accelerating effect can be detected, as 
before the introduction of the conditional decisions in 2016 the average duration 
of administrative was 25 days (second half of 2015). In the first half of 2016, the 
duration of the administrative cases was shortened significantly to only 14.9 days, 
and in the second half of 2016 even to 13.8 days (see Figure 4).
Source: OSAP statistics, www.kormany.hu/hu/dok?page=10&source=7&type=308#!DocumentBrowse [access: 
20.08.2019].
This is due to the fact that administrative organs try to keep cases in the sum-
mary procedure and issue the decision within 8 days in order to avoid switching 
to the full procedure where they would be obliged to issue a conditional decision 
also within 8 days from the commencement of the procedure (see Figures 5 and 6).
Source: OSAP statistics, www.kormany.hu/hu/dok?page=10&source=7&type=308#!DocumentBrowse [access: 
20.08.2019].
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Source: OSAP statistics, www.kormany.hu/hu/dok?page=10&source=7&type=308#!DocumentBrowse [access: 
20.08.2019].
Although the duration of procedures has slightly increased for 2018, it is still 
significantly shorter than before the reforms, because of the reduction the number 
of decisions made within 8 days. Thus, there is a correlation between the share 
of the decision made within 8 days and the average duration of the procedures: 
when the share of the decision made within 8 days decreased, the duration of the 
procedures was prolonged. Thus, one of the main accelerators of the duration of 
the procedures was the increasing share of the decisions made within 8 days (see 
Figure 7). This backslash in 2018 is probably due to the fact that the GAP, entering 
into force on 1 January 2018, narrowed the field of application of the conditional 
Source: OSAP statistics, www.kormany.hu/hu/dok?page=10&source=7&type=308#!DocumentBrowse [access: 
20.08.2019], edited by the Authors.
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decision, as most central agencies are now exempt from this obligation. This finding 
also supports the former thesis on the accelerating effect.
Nevertheless, it may constitute a problem that in order to keep the procedures 
in the summary procedure and away from the full procedure, more applications 
and requests are turned down as before. Unfortunately, no detailed statistics are 
available as to the nature of the decisions brought in the administrative procedures. 
Further systematic research will be necessary to clarify this point.
The introduction of the institution of conditional decision also has another 
interesting side effect which is connected to the distribution of competences in 
the field of the municipal administration. Generally, the representative bodies (the 
councils) of the municipalities are responsible for decision making in municipal 
administrative cases, but it is allowed by the Hungarian Municipal Code to transfer 
those powers to the personal leaders of the municipalities, both to the politician 
leader, the mayor and to the professional leader, the municipal clerk (jegyzö). This 
is due to the fact that conditional decision – as well as decisions in the summary 
procedure – has to be issued promptly, the deadline of 8 days is simply too short 
to be functioning in the decision-making procedure of a collegial body. Thus, the 
single-person decision making has been strengthened by the introduction of the 
conditional decision. Before the introduction of the conditional decision, 76.82% 
of the municipal cases were decided by the mayors and municipal clerks. After the 
reform, this share slightly increased to 79.59% (see Figure 8).
Source: OSAP statistics, www.kormany.hu/hu/dok?page=10&source=7&type=308#!DocumentBrowse [access: 
20.08.2019].
The main reforms of the new administrative procedural rules have mainly im-
pact on the speed of the administrative actions, but the silence of the administration 
was influenced limitedly by these new institutions.
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In the second pillar, we can witness a great step towards effective judicial pro-
tection against the silence of administration. Unfortunately, no judicial statistics 
can be found on their impact, therefore the practical use of these institutions cannot 
be analysed at the moment backed with data, but only through personal interviews.
CONCLUSIONS
Effective institutions against the silence of administration are those which 
devolve the powers of administration from the administrative organ failing to 
act. This type of sanction is used presently in a construction of positive silence of 
administration in the Hungarian administrative law. However, there are fields of 
administrative action where this institution is not suitable to combat the silence of 
administration, namely that of ex officio administrative procedures. This problem 
can be eased to some extent by a broad notion of the party enabling the interested 
persons or even the interested public to speak up in such cases, but it does not solve 
it. We can conclude thus, that the conditional decision cannot generally replace an 
institution which gives parties the possibility to contest failures, like the former 
plea for failure did. Given the restricted field of application and the fact that it is 
only an institution for procedures upon request, there are a lot of cases, where 
this instrument cannot help. Of course, the institutions of the administrative court 
procedure, par excellence the action for failure to act do give effective judicial 
protection in these cases, but its formalities and costs factually often restrict its 
effectiveness and cannot fully replace the less formal instruments provided within 
the administrative procedure.
The cases of administrative silence can also be tackled to some extent by 
reducing bureaucratic burdens. Nevertheless, the reduction of burdens regarding 
the starting and leading of administrative procedures for permits can easily result 
in other types of burdens both for parties and administrative organs. They involve 
additional costs and working hours at administrative organs and have the effect that 
more applications are turned down and thus rights precluded than before. Risks 
traditionally born by the administrative decision are now faced by the parties and 
result in additional costs. So, we have to face the fact that there are some burdens 
which cannot be totally deleted. Administrative procedure is like an equation – if 
we take away some burdens from one side of the equation, they have to be added 
to the other side. We can conclude that it is not the procedural rules, which need 
reforms over and over again, but material law, which is too complicated and not 
harmonised. Better training of civil servants would also be vital for more timeliness.
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STRESZCZENIE
Rozpoczęty w 2015 r. przez rząd węgierski Program Ograniczenia Biurokracji zawiera kilka 
kierunków, jak np. zmiana koncepcji systemu organów administracyjnych, zmiana kształtu służby 
cywilnej, uproszczenie procedur administracyjnych, a także walka z milczeniem organów admini-
stracji. W latach 2016 i 2017 wprowadzono nowe kodeksy postępowania administracyjnego i sądo-
woadministracyjnego oraz znowelizowano regulacje sektorowe. Najważniejszą zmianą w sektorowych 
przepisach postępowania była zamiana procedur związanych z uzyskaniem zgody na prosty obowiązek 
zgłoszenia. Przedmiotem artykułu było zbadanie, czy instytucje te istotnie pomagają w ograniczeniu 
biurokratycznych obciążeń obywateli i przedsiębiorstw oraz czy są one skutecznym narzędziem 
do radzenia sobie z milczeniem organów administracji i czy faktycznie poprawiają sytuację stron 
wobec administracji i sprzyjają dobrej administracji. Artykuł przybliża również nowo ustanowioną 
w Kodeksie postępowania sądowoadministracyjnego (obowiązującym od 2018 r.) skargę z tytułu 
bezczynności, pomyślaną jako dodatkowe narzędzie, a także nowe instytucje tego kodeksu dotyczące 
problemu milczenia organu administracji.
Słowa kluczowe: milczenie administracji publicznej; środki prawne na bezczynność organu; skarga 
na bezczynność organu administracji publicznej; prawo do dobrej administracji
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